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Abstract. Algorithmic decision-making is neither a recent phenomenon nor one necessarily associated with artificial intelligence
(AI), though advances in AI are increasingly resulting in what were heretofore human decisions being taken over by, or becoming
dependent on, algorithms and technologies like machine learning. Such developments promise many potential benefits, but are
not without certain risks. These risks are not always well understood. It is not just a question of machines making mistakes; it is
the embedding of values, biases and prejudices in software which can discriminate against both individuals and groups in society.
Such biases are often hard either to detect or prove, particularly where there are problems with transparency and accountability
and where such systems are outsourced to the private sector. Consequently, being able to detect and categorise these risks is
essential in order to develop a systematic and calibrated response. This paper proposes a simple taxonomy of decision-making
algorithms in the public sector and uses this to build a risk management framework with a number of components including an
accountability structure and regulatory governance. This framework is designed to assist scholars and practitioners interested in
ensuring structured accountability and legal regulation of AI in the public sphere.
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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with a specific challenge facing contemporary society namely managing the
risks that arise from the use of computer systems for supporting or making decisions in the public sector.
This is not a new risk, but it is one that is being amplified by the increasing use of artificial intelligence
(AI) in such decision-making. However, while much of the focus in this paper is on AI, we use the term
“algorithm” rather than AI. This requires a brief explanation. To do this it is first useful to set out what is
understood by AI and then briefly discuss the nature of algorithms.
Artificial intelligence is a broad church encompassing, in the view of some, everything from spell
checkers to the self-aware computers of science fiction such as HAL in 2001 – A Space Odyssey or 3CPO
in Star Wars to name but two. The EU High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (2019) has
sought to capture that breadth, proposing the following definition:
“Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are software (and possibly also hardware) systems designed
by humans that, given a complex goal, act in the physical or digital dimension by perceiving their
environment through data acquisition, interpreting the collected structured or unstructured data,
reasoning on the knowledge, or processing the information, derived from this data and deciding the
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best action(s) to take to achieve the given goal. AI systems can either use symbolic rules or learn a
numeric model, and they can also adapt their behaviour by analysing how the environment is affected
by their previous actions.
As a scientific discipline, AI includes several approaches and techniques, such as machine learning
(of which deep learning and reinforcement learning are specific examples), machine reasoning (which
includes planning, scheduling, knowledge representation and reasoning, search, and optimization),
and robotics (which includes control, perception, sensors and actuators, as well as the integration of
all other techniques into cyber-physical systems).” (EUHLEG 2019, p. 5)
A notable feature of AI is that its impact has been steadily spreading and deepening over a long period
of time. Some technologies such as, say, social networking or the World Wide Web, emerged and became
an important part of our social fabric in less than a decade. Others, such as the Internet (invented in 1969)
and AI have been burrowing their way into people’s lives for 50 years or more. Many developments
in so-called weak AI such as expert systems or voice recognition, both of which were developed and
improved over a long period, were once crude and unreliable, but are now sophisticated and widely
adopted. More recent developments include facial recognition and machine learning.
Not all algorithms qualify as forms of AI. An algorithm is nothing more than series of steps designed
to achieve a particular outcome. It is neither necessarily mathematical nor computer based. Amongst their
many applications, algorithms are used to solve problems, to optimise, to carry out daily tasks and to make
predictions. However, almost all non-trivial algorithms involve choices/decision-making at some level.
From deciding when to lower the flaps on an aircraft to determining whose tax returns should be audited,
computer systems across the world make vast numbers of decisions every minute. Almost all of these
decisions are uncontroversial and/or do not have life changing implications for individuals. But some
do. Of particular interest are complex and difficult to understand algorithms that make or recommend
decisions that have material implications or even life-changing consequences for individuals, groups
and/or societies. The danger of faulty algorithms was vividly and tragically illustrated by the crashes of
two Boeing 737 800 Max aircraft in 2018 and 2019. Much less tragic errors, but errors with other forms
of undesirable consequences for individual citizens, happen every day as a result of problems embedded
in software. What is possibly even more worrying is that some of these problems may not be bugs, but
features, i.e. policies and/or prejudices consciously or unconsciously built into the code and/or problems
caused by biases in the underlying data that they use (Ntoutsi et al., 2020).
Consequently, while, as AI based algorithmic decision-making becomes more and more widespread, the
focus of concern going forward has to be on this technology, it is necessary to consider all decision-making
algorithms. Algorithms exist on a risk spectrum; they range from the insignificant to the momentous.
We need to learn how to recognise, for any given algorithmic decision-making process, not just its
benefits, but its potential risks and how to calibrate and manage such risks. We need to learn how to
control algorithms before they come to control us any more than they already do. This paper will propose
structures and mechanisms which can help ensure that we remain in control. While the word “algorithm”
is the word most often used in this paper, the term “artificial intelligence” or AI will be used throughout
this paper to refer specifically to its application to decision-making of the type being examined.
2. Literature review
2.1. Problems with AI and decision making
Concern about the potentially negative impacts of artificial intelligence have long been a staple of
science fiction, both in literature and in the cinema. Many of these works have been prescient. To take
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just one example, Primo Levi (1966) in one of his amusing short science fiction stories, Pieno Impeigo
(Full Employment), describes the development of a machine that today we would call a search engine and
briefly speculates on its implications. Academic research on this topic has, however, been more scarce
largely because, while writers of fiction can indulge freely in speculation about the future, scholars have
to be more measured – particularly when it comes to predicting the impacts of a new technology and the
risks that such technologies may bring with them.
One of the first researchers to conceptualise risk in terms of its dimensions was Cunningham (1967).
The distinct dimensions that he proposed were uncertainty and consequences – concepts today widely
used in the form of expected outcomes. Both of these dimensions are salient when considering AI, as
the many uncertainties regarding the potential impact AI on society are increasingly juxtaposed with
an awareness that the consequences of unbridled AI could wreak havoc on individuals and on society
more generally (see, for example, Bostrom, 2014). Away from such dystopian discourses, there are many
practical risks arising from the use of AI in day to day operations that need to be managed (as would be the
case with any new technology). As will be shown below, there is growing evidence of AI-related damage
occurring, albeit for now only in a localised way. Rather than assuming a perspective that enumerates only
potential positive or only negative AI scenarios and outcomes, a more realistic position is to acknowledge
the uncertainty that exists and conceptualise the risks of AI as a set of potential trade-offs that need to be
carefully evaluated and managed.
The work of Floridi et al. (2018) is particularly valuable in this regard. These authors identify four types
of risk associated with AI that are relevant to society and consider how we can balance the opportunities
that AI offers against the potential risks that it presents.
The first relates to the enabling of human self-realisation without devaluing human abilities. Floridi et
al. point out that although smart automation may free us from the tedium of monotonous tasks (just as
did invention of the washing machine) and allow us to spend our time more intelligently, the risks that
arise are not just those of making older skills obsolete with the emergence of new ones, but rather the
pace at which this is happening and the resulting unequal distribution of costs and benefits. For example,
employment serves economic, social and even cultural purposes in our society and the devaluation of
old skills has the potential to disrupt the nature of employment at the level of both the individual and
society. Beyond its obvious economic implications, jobs are central to an individual’s sense of personal
identity and meaning, their self-esteem and their sense of self, whilst at a societal level de-skilling has
potential to result in loss of human abilities and skills, thereby creating vulnerabilities in the event of AI
malfunction. In this context, an extensive body of research has examined the effects of automation on the
labour market (e.g. Manyika & Bughin, 2018; Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017; Arntz et al., 2016; Karoly &
Panis 2004), but much of that work has focused on robotic systems with limited intelligence which follow
pre-programmed instructions to complete specific manual tasks. Emerging AI systems in contrast do not
require such specific, bounded guidance and are capable of acting independently on insights obtained
from data.
The second risk that Floridi et al. identify, one that is of particular relevance here, relates to the
need to ensure enhancement of human agency without removing human responsibility. AI augments our
intelligence in the same way as machines have previously augmented our abilities and outputs. However,
they point to the need for responsibility in deciding what sort of AI we develop, how it is used and whether
it should be shared with everyone. The question becomes to what degree do we abdicate responsibility
for decision making to machines? The use of AI in parole decisions or creditworthiness decisions are just
two of hundreds of possible examples. This question has a number of consequences that are discussed in
subsequent sections.
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In theory, an AI decision-making system can be objective or neutral (assuming that we can reach a
consensus on what those terms mean – not a given by any means), but in most social decision-making
contexts AI is almost never neutral and decisions made by complex algorithms are, almost by definition,
never objective. To enable an algorithm to make a decision, values must be embedded in its code or
indirectly in the data that it uses. Consequently, the use of AI in, for example, surveillance and military
applications as well as use in social media and election result manipulation raises understandable concerns.
As Manyika and Bughin (2018) note, AI has the potential to introduce new biases or perpetuate and
institutionalise existing social and procedural biases. A recent report from the AI Now Institute (Myers
West et al., 2019) found that the AI field, which is overwhelmingly white and male, is at risk of replicating
historical biases and power imbalances. Because of its capabilities, AI is also at risk of amplifying biases
and discriminatory practices. Examples of this abound, including use of image recognition services that
make offensive classifications of minorities (as happened with Google Photos), chatbots that adopt hate
speech (such as happened with Microsoft’s Twitter bot Tay and systems like Amazon’s facial recognition
technology Rekognition which was marketed to law enforcement agencies, but has been shown to fail to
recognise the gender of individuals with darker skin colours. According to Singer (2019) failures of this
nature raise fundamental questions regarding whether facial recognition technology is suitable for use in
important decision-making situations including job interviews, in drones and in police body cameras.
Designed correctly, AI can amplify individual agency and strengthen moral systems, but as the Floridi
et al. note, the degree of agency that we delegate to autonomous system is not a zero-sum game either
pragmatically or ethically and it would be particularly unwise to ignore this fact.
The third risk they cite relates to the need to increase societal capabilities without reducing human
control. AI presents a multitude of possibilities for augmenting and enhancing the collective capabilities of
humans, assisting us to find solutions to enduring problems with significant individual and social impact,
including early identification or even prevention of disease. But these authors note that it is precisely
because of this, the fact that such technologies have the potential to be so powerful and disruptive, that
they introduce proportionate risks. They argue that if we rely on AI to augment our own abilities in the
wrong way, we may delegate important decisions to autonomous systems, systems that should remain at
least partly subject to human supervision and choice. Worse, these potential harms could accumulate and
become entrenched as more functions are delegated to machines. There is therefore a need to strike a
balance between pursuing the opportunities offered by AI to improve human life on one hand and on the
other hand ensuring that we remain in control of these developments and their effects
The final risk identified by Floridi et al. (2018) is how we can cultivate social cohesion without
eroding human self-determination? In the face of current global societal problems such as climate change,
terrorism, antimicrobial resistance and other similar problems, there is a need for high degrees of co-
ordination between the stakeholders if these problems are to be successfully addressed.1 AI has obvious
unique abilities to support such coordination complexity and to support greater collaboration and a more
cohesive response, through reminder notifications, identifying those who are transgressing socially agreed
norms or standards etc. The emergence of social scoring in China is a particularly worrying development
(Liang et al., 2018; Creemers, 2018). This can already result in people with low scores being denied
certain services such as access to housing (Mitchell & Diamond, 2018).2 As we seek to design societal
frameworks that work for all, there are likely to be algorithmic systems that we adopt to self-nudge us to
1This article is being written during the middle of COVID-19 pandemic, but we have resisted the temptation to bring pandemics
into the discussion.
2An episode of the TV series Black Mirror (Nosedive) explored this theme.
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behave in socially preferable ways. However in adopting such systems, we run the risk of colluding with
AI in eroding human self-determination as systems change human behaviour to accommodate outcomes.
This is not, of course, a public sector monopoly. As Zubhoff (2019) has shown, private companies are
seeking the same goal, i.e. the manipulation of humans and effectively a reduction in their agency.
2.2. AI-augmented government
Eggers and Beyer (2019) suggest that AI has potential to bring significant improvements in efficiency
or cost savings to government by replacing existing decision-making processes and as the basis for
policy determinations. The rationale behind this view is that government agencies are characterised by
voluminous data and AI can both process and learn from these data much more efficiently than humans,
thereby making it possible to tackle administrative problems in ways that were not previously possible
and lowering costs. It is therefore understandable that, even outside of periods of austerity governments
will seek to procure and deploy AI. Examples of current applications include:
– Use of AI driven chatbots to assist patients with chronic conditions in the UK;
– Use of AI in Japan to analyse medical test results and recommend appropriate treatments;
– AI-enabled traffic lights in Pittsburgh;
– The use of analytics in Singapore to reduce traffic congestion;
– The use of chatbots to answer queries from human services case processing officers in Australia;
– The use of machine learning in the Netherlands to detect fraud in social benefit programmes;
– In Chicago the use of spatial algorithms on 911 call data to predict where and when violent crimes
are most likely to happen;
– Use of AI to predict how disease will spread over time. Dynamic neural networks were used to
predict spread of the Zika virus in 2015 and (at the time of writing) these were being re-trained using
Covid-19 data.
These examples are only the tip of a large iceberg. These types of application are attractive at a number
of levels, but there are potentially serious problems with the use of AI in many situations. For example,
AI currently cannot generally take account of nuances that human agents may detect. Failure by machines
to do this may have detrimental outcomes for many vulnerable populations including, for example, those
requiring affordable housing, food assistance benefits or children at risk. The Nash report (2017) into the
death of a child in Los Angeles found that an autonomous decision system failed to identify the child
as being at risk. Instead, reflecting encoded bias, the system focused on poor children from working
class communities, especially communities of colour. Similarly, automated essay scoring systems have
been shown to encode bias against certain ethnic groups (Eubanks, 2018). These exacerbate existing
inequalities in relation to further education and employment opportunities.
2.3. Specific problems with social decision-making algorithms
The literature on the impact of algorithmic decision making on people, organizations and societies is
relatively new, but growing rapidly. In recent years, a number of books have explored this phenomenon.
One influential contributor to this debate is O’Neil (2016). O’Neil uses the word “model” rather than
algorithm. The words do not have the same meaning, but in this context they can be considered as
interchangeable. “Models”, writes O’Neill, “are opinions embedded in mathematics” (p. 12). Although
her focus is on the private sector, she also argues that the algorithms built into models and the data that
they use can create biases and distortions in public policy. For example, she points out how algorithms
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can be biased against certain types of college or job applicant. Using other examples O’Neil discusses
how machine learning systems that use historical data can learn the wrong things and end up embedding
the prejudices, or even the now illegal practices, of an earlier era. A further shortcoming of some machine
learning systems is that there are no feedback mechanisms that tell them whether the decisions that they
made were good or bad. Even with supervised learning, there is a risk that any biases the supervisor has
will be absorbed by the machine. Consider a system which recommends whether or not to hire somebody
for a job (such systems exist – see Stanojevic (2020)). If a poor applicant is accepted, then there is at least
the possibility of feedback that the decision was not a good one because the employee’s performance will
be monitored and that performance can in theory (if not necessarily always in practice) be fed back to the
software. However should the computer reject a potentially outstanding applicant, the system will never
know. As a consequence, it never learns from this type of mistake.
A further problem is that it is often impossible to question or contest the decisions made by certain
systems. This particularly the case when, as Whittaker et al. (2018) note, the systems are developed
by private vendors and are not subject to public testing, review or auditing to ensure their fitness for
a domain. Such systems may be built without explicit public oversight or accountability and are often
opaque, a problem that makes discovery of erroneous automated outcomes more difficult. In support
of this fact, Whittaker et al. reference the use of a third-party automated decision-making system by
Houston Independent School District that used student test data to make decisions regarding teacher
employment, promotions and terminations. It transpired that no employee in the School District was
able to explain the determinations made by the system despite legal attempts to make them do so. The
vendor refused to provide any access to enable experts to determine how the system worked. This type of
lack of transparency and explicability, the growing accountability deficit, favours those who create the
decision-making technologies at the expense of those who are affected.
Such cases highlight the need for greater transparency, oversight, and accountability in the adoption,
development, and implementation of automated decision-making systems. They also highlight the need to
reflect on the economic and policy factors that underpin their usage by government, specifically whether
their usage is for the benefit of society. Whittaker et al. propose that automated decision systems fairness
research needs to be expanded beyond a focus on mathematical parity and statistical fairness towards
issues of justice, a view that we strongly endorse. Finally, it is worth noting that this problem is now
widely recognised. For example, the EUHIEG Guidelines on Trustworthy AI (EUHLIG 2019) propose
seven key requirements that AI needs to meet namely:
1. Human agency and oversight;
2. Technical robustness and safety;
3. Privacy and data governance;
4. Transparency;
5. Diversity, non-discrimination and fairness;
6. Societal and environmental well-being;
7. Accountability.
In considering each of these areas, the question of risk is important.
2.4. Summary
In summary, when it comes to the use of AI in public decision making, significant concerns remain
regarding lack of due process, accountability, community engagement and auditing. Whittaker et al. (2018)
reference another case where an individual in Arkansas in the United States was assessed for disability
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carer supports. The initial nurse-led assessment in 2008 determined that the woman in question required
56 hours of home care help per week. However, in 2016 the automated decision system that was now
employed in Arkansas to make these assessments, (using a proprietary algorithm) calculated that the same
woman only required 32 hours of carer support per week, a drop in the level of care that had a detrimental
impact on her quality of life. By the time use of this algorithmic allocation programme was subsequently
successfully subjected to legal challenge and determined to be erroneous and unconstitutional, irreparable
damage to the lives of many citizens had already been done.
From the perspective of this paper, a particularly powerful and relevant critique is provided by Eubanks
(2018).3 Eubanks considers a number of cases of public sector computer systems that affect the lives of
people including the allocation of housing in Los Angeles and child abuse prediction in Pittsburgh. She
shows how computerised decision-making systems are simply too rigid and inflexible for the complex
real-world problems with which they are trying to deal. The result is that people are denied treatments,
benefits or even access to services to which they are entitled. Wachter-Boettcher (2017) argues that it is
all too easy for biases to become “baked into” applications and systems. These include the prejudices of
policy makers, but can also include the prejudices of designers and programmers as problems inherited
from the data are used to train machine learning systems. Noble (2018) discusses the problem of racial
bias built into search engines. While this is a separate issue, the sources of bias she describes are not
limited to Google and Bing.
Decision making algorithms have many uses and many advantages. Indeed, such algorithms are at the
heart of what has been called digital-era governance (Margetts & Dunleavy, 2013) and similar ideas about
what Williamson calls knowing public services (Williamson, 2014). However, as ever more decisions are
delegated to, or influenced by, machines, so grows the need for systems of regulating, controlling and
monitoring those machines. Leadbeater (2011, p. 18) describes a system of “government by algorithm”
that uses “systems to mine and analyse data, to make automated decisions about allocating resources.”
Demos researchers Wind-Cowie and Lekhi (2012, p. 63) argue that big data:
“. . . should be viewed as a transformative agent that has the potential to revitalise, reinvigorate and
renew public services.”
As Williamson (2014) puts it (p. 18):
“Algorithms that can be taught to anticipate and predict how people act, or machine learning, have
been positioned as a major component of the new techniques of governing promoted by these think
tankers and intermediaries.”
On the other hand, these government databases do not merely represent the individual. Instead, as they
continually join together different pieces of data, they constantly remake the identity of the individual,
anticipate likely future behaviours and requirements, and continually recalculate decisions about the best
lines of intervention. As goes the private sector (Zubhoff, 2019), so goes the public (Fredridksson et al.,
2017; Klievink et al., 2017), although the public sector’s use of big data is more likely to be constrained
by legal requirements (such as the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe). The individual is a
composite enactment made up by software out of data rather than a fixed and stable identity. Williamson
(2015, p. 100) draws attention to the point made by Ruppert (2013) that:
3There is a talk by Virginia Eubanks available on YouTube in which she elaborates on the ideas in her book at: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=4xzDgesK2wU.
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“. . . such software systems or ‘algorithm machines’ do not merely implement a policy or programme
but are generative of both their subjects of governing and modes of intervention” (Ruppert 2013:
p. 100.).
The literature on AI or algorithmic decision making in complex public sector problems is still embry-
onic, but a number of clear messages emerge from it. Six important points to emerge from the current
literature which are important in the context of this paper are:
1. Faced with complex human or social problems, it is almost impossible for AI decision-making
systems to be objective.
2. Feedback mechanisms are often absent or partial, so systems do not learn or alternatively may learn
the wrong things because they use historical data which may not be relevant to the current situation.
3. Values need to be embedded in the code of many systems which means that existing human biases
and values can also become embedded in the code – sometimes consciously, but also subconsciously.
4. There are significant negative and damaging consequences for people/citizens currently occurring
as a result of the use of machine decision-making.
5. There is a large incentive to use such systems to displace more expensive human decision makers.
6. In addition to problems with equity and fairness, there are problems with transparency, explicability
and accountability, particularly when such systems are outsourced to the private sector.
To this we would add, as already noted that the risks are not yet always well understood. Addressing
these problems is not easy. In the following sections we put forward a framework and some ideas about
how to limit the potential damage caused by such systems.
3. A risk assessment framework
We first propose a framework for categorising decision-making algorithms based on two elements:
– A two by two typology;
– A three-dimensional risk spectrum.
Both of these are described in the following sections.
3.1. A two by two typology
All algorithms can first be classified by whether or not they use subjective data. This statement
immediately raises the question: what do we mean by ‘subjective’ data?
All data used by algorithms, whatever its source or whatever form or format it takes, can be classified
as objective or subjective. This has parallels with what is generally referred to in the decision support
literature as “hard” and “soft” data. As Saaty (2000) puts it hard measurement must be consistent with
what is known in nature, whereas soft measurement must be consistent with what is known in the mind.
Of course much data depend on scales and categories created by humans, but the distinction we will
use is that objective data is not dependent on, or arrived at using human judgement be that of designer
programmer or (with some qualifications – see below) user.
An objection to this definition is to claim that all data involves a degree of subjectivity (an argument
that has parallels in the longstanding debate about constructivist and positivist research). Almost ev-
erything physical that we measure, height, weight, temperature, speed and so on is based on scales or
criteria designed by humans and some of these scales are only analogues for more complex phenomena
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(temperature being a good example). Nonetheless we argue that there is a tractable difference between
such data and personal or social or psychological variables such as happiness, poverty, tolerance, risk
aversion and so on. In fact, many of the latter are constructs rather than variables in the formal sense and
can only be measured indirectly or by proxy. They are much more complicated to measure and dependent
on scales that are typically fuzzy and often arbitrary. We argue that not only is this a valid distinction, but
that, for all practical purposes, it is binary.
There is, to take one example, a clear distinction between, say, the airspeed of an aircraft as measured
by a sensor and, say, a police officer’s assessment, in a bail application, of a suspect’s flight risk. This
is not just a distinction between something measured by an instrument and something “measured” by
a human. Headcounts are objective data even when the counting is done by a person, but a headcount
is fundamentally different from data based on an opinion or a judgement, no matter how informed that
opinion may be. A simple test is whether presented with the same environment or set of circumstances,
a properly calibrated measuring device will always give exactly the same answer. In this context, how
the scale is arrived at is unimportant. There is a categorical difference between measuring a patient’s
body temperature and asking a patient to rank her pain on a scale of one to ten. Most of the data collected
by sensors fall into the objective category, but so do other data such as (as already mentioned) counts
of various sort or financial data such as cash paid. Subjective data encompasses a wide range of types
including constructs, assessments, value judgements, human estimates, opinions and so on. It should be
noted that the term “data” is not confined to data that is input by the user when an algorithm is run, it can
be, and frequently is, embedded in the algorithm itself.
We acknowledge that concept of objective data is not problem free. A specific problem in AI for
example is unstructured data (such as a photograph or video). A photograph can be objective in the sense
meant here if it does not directly involve human judgement, but an AI system seeking to make “sense” of
a photograph may derive, for example, from supervised learning that may have been be biased to seek out
particular features. Of particular relevance in this context is facial recognition.
Secondly, algorithms can be passive in the sense that they solely inform human decision-making or
active in the sense that machines make decisions whose consequences are enacted without further human
review or involvement or approval. Historically, most decision-making algorithms have been passive. This
is what is meant by the term “decision support system” – in itself a large field of both academic research
and commercial products (Power, 2008).4 Algorithms underlie most decision support systems. More
recently, advances in technology have resulted in a rapid expansion in the use of active algorithms. Most
modern commercial jet aircraft depend on software that both makes decisions and executes them. Active
decision-making algorithms have become an important concept in “e-governance” (or digital governance)
(Sharma, 2019; Plantera, 2017). As use of algorithms in governance and public administration expands, it
is important to understand the implications of ceding the authority to make decisions to machines. What
types of decision can be safely outsourced to AI systems and what should be the province of human
decision makers? Equally important, how do we exercise control over these machines?
The above analysis leads to the two by two framework illustrated in Fig. 1.
The following are some illustrative examples of each classification. Further examples and their impli-
cations are discussed elsewhere below.
4A search for “Decision Support Systems” in Google Scholar yields over 750,000 hits.
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Fig. 1. Classification of algorithms.
3.1.1. Objective/passive (OP)
A simple example of an objective/passive algorithm used in our country is one to compute a citizen’s
pay related pension entitlement. This is based on a number of factors, primarily on the number and type
of “stamps” that a person’s various employers have paid for during their working life. There are also
technical adjustments that can be made in certain circumstances. The computation is based on purely
objective data with no human judgements involved. The rules are explicit. This is a simple example, but
public administration is replete with such algorithms. Much of management science/operations research
falls into this category e.g. techniques like linear programming or the North-West corner algorithm. While
the outputs or results of such algorithms can be implemented automatically, they are typically inputs into
human decisions.
3.1.2. Objective/active (OA)
Objective/Active algorithms are widely used in a variety of areas including the operation of machinery.
The example of the airspeed sensor given above is just one of numerous sensors on which modern aircraft
rely. In normal conditions, most modern commercial aircraft can, for example, land without any input
from or action on the part of the pilots. This process depends on numerous algorithms and sensors as well
as data transmitted to the aircraft from systems on the runway and air traffic control. Algorithms of this
type are found everywhere. A lift/elevator will not move if the weight of the passengers is greater than its
certification permits; a police camera will take a photograph only if a vehicle exceeds a certain speed an
automatic car will change gear when appropriate and so on.
3.1.3. Subjective/passive (SP)
Subjective passive algorithms are based on human judgements or decisions which may be quite arbitrary
or, in some cases, deliberately biased. Consider a Google search. The results of a search request returned
by Google are determined by a whole host of factors built into the ranking algorithm – something that has
been decided by Google’s engineers. When the algorithm is changed, ‘before and after’ searches may
present a different ordering of results or even present different results entirely. Google changes its search
engine all the time, 3,234 times in 2018 alone (Moz, 2019). Search algorithms are passive because they
pass their output back to the user and how the user uses that information (for example to book a hotel, to
buy a product, to find out how to get somewhere, etc.) is up to the user. Most expert systems fall into
this category. Recent discussion of medical diagnostics being undertaken by computers has provided
evidence that computers are already more accurate than most human doctors in the diagnosis of certain
illnesses such as skin cancer (Budd, 2019). So far however, use of such systems requires presenting
human doctors with the diagnostic findings and allowing the doctors to take it from there. This will
typically take the form of various possible diagnoses with probabilities attached. Basic forms of such
expert systems are available on the Web. WebMD is one such example. Such systems are becoming
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steadily more sophisticated.5 One problem with this type of algorithm can be the reluctance of humans to
question the system. Human validation of machine decisions is only useful in as much as humans think
carefully about what the machine is telling them.
3.1.4. Subjective/active (SA)
While all four types of algorithm are of concern, the fourth category, subjective/active is the most
significant from the point of view of risk in public administration. This is where a computer makes a
decision based on subjective data supplied by humans and executes a policy decision based on those
data. These data often include criteria, thresholds or scores that the system uses to make a decision and
to act accordingly. A good example is so-called job pre-screening. When you apply for a job in certain
companies today, they will ask you to go online and fill in a form and/or questionnaire. Based on your
answers, you may, or may not, be called for an interview. Many such systems today also gather data
not supplied by the candidate directly, but extracted from social media and other on-line sources. This
may not only be used to rank a candidate, but to decide whether the candidate is a good “fit’ for the job
(Berkelaar & Buzzanell, 2014). Such algorithms are being used in situations where the consequences
are more serious, for example in determining whether a child should be taken into care or the length
of a prison sentence. They are also being developed for complex judgement tasks such as examination
marking of textual answers (Ab Aziz et al., 2009; Shermis & Burstein, 2013; Nwosu, 2017; RM Results,
2018).
All of the four types have certain risks associated with them though those associated with objec-
tive/passive algorithms are probably fairly modest. In section four we examine some of the risks that the
other three types, and in particular SA algorithms present in a public sector context. Before doing that,
we first consider the risk spectrum.
3.2. A three-dimensional risk metric
In considering the risk(s) presented by an algorithm, three dimensions need to be considered.
The first is transparency. Transparency has long been the subject of much discussion (Bannister &
Connolly, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009). Transparency can refer to data or to process or in the case
of algorithms, to both. Meaningful transparency in this context is the ability to see the code/steps in the
algorithm so that that people can understand how does its job and how it arrives at its conclusion and/or
its decision(s). A critical distinction needs to be made between the ability to see what an algorithm is
doing and the ability to understand or explain what it is doing (see below).
Google’s page ranking algorithm is a good case in point. What determines the order of the results
that you see when you do a Google search? Google does not disclose this although it makes certain
information available. Obviously, the main reason Google does not publish details of the algorithm is
that the Page Rank algorithm is proprietary and valuable commercial property. Another reason is that
it wishes to prevent web site owners gaming the system (a common practice in the past and still tried
today). A public system is, or should be, different and yet public bodies have refused, often for what
seem like spurious reasons, to publish the code in the algorithms that they use (Carlson, 2017; Whittaker
et al., 2018; Eubanks, 2018). It is also important that the code or logic underlying the algorithm be
made available in a readable form. The more opaque an algorithm, the higher the risk of unforeseen
consequences. Unfortunately some algorithms are black boxes where those affected have no way of
5And the bane of physicians lives as more and more patients arrive in surgery convinced that they know what their problem is.
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knowing how a decision or recommendation is reached. In extreme cases, the authors of the algorithm
may not even know (Veale et al., 2018).6 It is important to acknowledge that citizens have always sought
to game public services, from housing lists to tax loopholes, but this should mean changing the rules to
prevent such behaviour, not trying to hide them.
A second criterion is comprehensibility. Users (or experts acting on their behalf) should be able to
understand what an algorithm does and explain how it arrived at its decision. Transparency is of limited
value if the code is readable, but indecipherable. There is an important distinction between the algorithms
used inside machines, those used in business and those used in the public sector. For example, in the
case of avionics or diagnostic machines it is not expected that users (pilots or doctors) will understand
the computer code, but they need to understand what the system does and how it behaves in different
conditions. To ensure that such systems behave properly and as expected, organisations like the Federal
Aviation Authority and the Federal Drugs Administration and their counterparts in other countries certify
these systems.7 Businesses, like Google or Microsoft, may be subject to regulation in some areas, but
not in others and are under no obligation to publish the details of the algorithms that they use. A bank
may refuse somebody credit based on a proprietary scoring algorithm. In many countries, the bank would
not be under any legal obligation to explain to the customer why he has been refused credit. However,
when a public sector system makes a decision or recommends one, it should be incumbent on the public
body concerned to explain how and why the decision was made. Unfortunately, not only do some public
bodies not do this, some of them are unable to do it. Reasons for withholding explanations vary, but tend
to include confidentiality and preventing people from gaming the system. Regardless of the rationale, the
risk is that in the future a reason for withholding an explanation may turn out to be because the agency
simply does not know what the explanation is. It is not just transparency that matters in this case, it is
understanding what the code is doing. Ananny and Crawford (2018) refer to this problem as “seeing
without knowing”.
The third criterion is impact. The impact or influence of an algorithm on individuals, groups or even
societies varies from unimportant to (literally) existential. Negative impacts range from being a source of
minor irritation to (again, literally) life-endangering. Table 1 contains is a list of examples of impacts
roughly ranked from the marginal to the highly significant.
If one goes to a government website and searches for a particular service or document, then the
efficiency and effectiveness of that search does matter, but the order in which search results are presented
is rarely of importance. At the other extreme, where algorithms are used to target specific electoral
messages to certain voters, there is a potential for major distortions to democracy.
Defining a scale of this nature will require some thought and debate. Similar scales are used in other
areas where direct measurement is not meaningful. Two well-known examples are subjective pain scales
(Pesudovs & Noble, 2005) or the hunger scale (Derby Community Heath Service 2020). Table 2 is not
proposed as a definitive scale, but is indicative of what such a scale might look like.
4. Governing algorithms
Governance has been a topic of growing interest for quite some time and, as is seen all too frequently,
6An interesting example is the Irish Tax Authorities who, when they started implementing an entirely new computer system in
the 1990s, had to leave one part of the system on legacy machines because nobody understood the code and trying to re-write it
was too risky. Eventually, not only did nobody understand the code, nobody still working in the Authority was familiar with the
tax laws encoded in the system (though the legislation was still on the books).
7It is worth noting that the delegation of this role by some authorities to companies has been much criticised, most recently in
the case of Boeing, but reliance on self-regulation was a factor in the lead up to the banking crisis in 2007/8.




Nudging: (at worst irritating) Targeted advertisements
Tailored deals/special offers
Biased (often disguised as ‘personalized’) search
results
Recommendations (books, hotels, friends)
News that is “recommended for you”
Rate of interest that you are charged on a loan
Whether you get a loan or a credit card
Whether you get a job interview
Whether you receive a social security payment
Whether your health insurance pays out
Whether you can get insurance at all
What jail sentence you are given
Whether your child is taken into care
Potentially life changing (at worst, destructive) Triggering a global financial crash
Undermining democracy
Table 2







Something designed to encourage an action or behaviour, but aimed at the general public. Public advice.




Decisions that could affect somebody’s income in a minor way, for example a rate of interest or the





An example is something that may have a serious long term impact, but not a life threatening one. A
contemporary example is the algorithms used to assign grades to students who were not been able to sit





Decision on whether somebody gets free legal aid or a housing grant. Longer term decisions on what




Sentencing systems. Decision on taking children into foster or temporary care. Longer term examples




An algorithm that has the capability to decide whether to give a death sentence or who gets medical
treatment or is first to get a new vaccine. Algorithms that could endanger democracy or individual
liberties (in, for example, e-voting systems).
where governance is poor or absent it almost invariably results in undesirable consequences. The use of
decision-making algorithms (and AI generally) requires proper governance and this topic has recently
started to attract academic attention in the legal and philosophical literature (Coglianese & Lehr, 2018;
Lepri et al., 2018; Fink, 2018; Valentine, 2019).
There are three components necessary for such governance:
1. Risk assessment and management
2. Accountability and
3. Regulation.
We discuss each of these in turn.
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4.1. Risk assessment and management – Using the framework
The framework whose elements have been described in the preceding section can be used to assess the
risk associated with a given algorithm or AI system. Risk is assessed under four headings:




The type of algorithm affects risk. OP algorithms, while not always risk free, are generally low risk.
Such algorithms can be faulty like any other, but subjective bias will only occur when the user’s own
internal bias(es) affects a decision on the basis of what the algorithm has told the user, though there is an
increased risk when a bias in the machine coincides with a user’s own bias.
OA algorithms are somewhat higher risk, but the risk lies in possible design and programming flaws
rather than in built in bias.
SP algorithms are higher risk again as they depend both on the risk of internal bias within the machine
and on the human user’s ability to use what the machine tells him or her effectively and to use it to inform,
but not override his or her own judgement. A system recommendation of a sentence for somebody found
guilty can be modified by a judge for example. The difficulty is that many humans may be reluctant to
override a machine recommendation. One reason for this may be legal or personal exposure; it can be
safer to hide behind the algorithm. An analogous problem is over-testing in medicine. Some doctors order
large numbers of tests, not because they are necessary for diagnosis or action, but because of the fear
that if something goes wrong, they will be sued for having failed to explore every possibility. By relying
on the computer, responsibility can be transferred to the computer and by implication to the system
designers and coders. Where, as seen in the literature review, the system provider is a private company
that refuses to disclose details of how its decision-making algorithms work, then the responsibility falls
into a black hole – similar to the excuse that is often used in the public sector of ‘systemic failure’ where
the avoidance of individual blame is key.
SA algorithms present the greatest risk. In such systems, the decision is entirely abdicated to the
machine.
It would not be difficult to develop a scoring system based on these, but it would be better if expert
actors looked at a given decision-making system under each of these headings and assessed risk on a
spectrum. A black box system based on subjective scoring which can affect people’s lives in fundamental
ways would be high risk; a support system which offers powerful ‘what if’ type exploration of the
potential consequences of different decisions is likely to be lower risk (though not risk free).
One does not have to go far to find systems that, by any standards, are medium to high risk. One case
which has been in the news recently is the UK Home Office’s system for processing visa applications
(Warrell, 2019). This is a SP type system; the algorithm streams and ranks applicants into red, amber
and green according to their level of perceived risk and then passes this information to humans to decide
whether or not to approve the application. The Home Office has refused to disclose details of which
factors are used to assess this risk or how they are weighted. Such an algorithm is ineluctably based on a
large amount of subjective judgement as, of its nature, statistical data on such risks will be incomplete.
Commenting on the system, Christine Blacklaws, president of the British Law Society observed that such
a system:
“. . . may well disadvantage certain groups of people based on generic markers such as age, country of
origin or whether they have travelled before”.
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But the public does not know. This raises the question; should the public know? There are circumstances
when transparency is clearly not in the public interest (Moon & Adams, 2015). In this case, transparency
might enable people to game the system. This possibility therefore has to be factored into any risk
assessment.
In other words, just because an algorithm is an impenetrable black-box or has its code available on-line
does not, of itself, make the system high or low risk. It depends on the purpose of the algorithm – if an
error in such a system does not have major consequences the risk might be ranked low. Nevertheless,
while risk is determined by a combination of factors, use of opaque algorithms is, with rare exceptions,
not a good policy.
4.2. Accountability
Algorithms require policing (Veale et al., 2018) and that means that there needs to be an accountability
framework. Accountability can be a problematic concept at the best of times (Dubnick, 2002). It is based
on the principle that individuals and/or organisations are answerable for their actions and that failure or
bad behaviour will be identified, exposed, where possible corrected and, where appropriate, punished. In
practice, organizations frequently seek to hide problems, are reluctant to expose themselves to full scrutiny
even when problems are identified and are adept at avoiding punishments that should be imposed on those
responsible. True accountability is often lacking in the public sector (Guerin, 2018) and even where it
exists, sanctioning of the individuals responsible for failure frequently does not happen. Politicians often
suffer as a result of administrative failures over which they have little or no control or influence while
those actually culpable for such failures hide behind the shield of public service anonymity
Ignoring for the moment the many real-world shortcomings of accountability in practice, accountability
means, in principle at least, that some person or persons is answerable for a decision and if that decision
is bad then sanctions can be applied to a human being. This may range from public criticism to demotion,
firing, a fine or, in extreme cases, a jail sentence (or, in the case of politicians, having to resign or losing
their seat at the next election).
In any bureaucracy, the standard way to avoid personal sanction is to blame the system. The term
‘systemic failure’ has already been mentioned and is a commonplace in public life where numerous
failures of public policy or practice have successfully been blamed on the ‘the system’ by individual
public servants and managers (Anderson, 2009; O’Brien, 2012; Leon & Orriols, 2019). In some countries,
it is common for government ministers or senior managers to resign and take the blame for failure on the
part of their subordinates. In others it is rare, although it occasionally does happen (Bardon, 2017).
But what happens when the failure or scandal is caused by an algorithm? In such circumstances, the
term ‘systemic failure’ acquires new possibilities. Who should carry the can? Consider the Boeing 800
Max disasters. It was a software failure (or a combination of software and hardware failures) that led to
the two tragedies. If we want to attribute blame for this to a human (or humans), who should that be?
There is a long list of candidates including:
– The Federal Aviation Authority (who delegated testing to Boeing);
– Boeing senior management (for deciding to rely on software to fix an inherently unstable configura-
tion rather than re-designing the aircraft);
– The aircraft’s designers (who, inter alia, specified only one speed sensor creating a single point of
failure);
– The managers who decided not to have a second sensor in order to reduce costs;
– The software designers;
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– The programmers who wrote the code;
– The project managers who failed to test the system adequately;
– The people in Boeing who failed to put in place proper training for the pilots.
There are undoubtedly others. The only people who were not responsible were the pilots (who of course
were the first to be blamed by Boeing).8
It is not hard to translate this catalogue of possible people responsible into any one of a number of
public service contexts.
One way of dealing with this would be to define a clear structure of what might be called responsibility
points for any public sector decision-making system. At the moment, the single point of accountability
is usually a politician (or a carefully chosen scapegoat – often well down the line). Responsibility
points would assign both responsibility and accountability and clarify the borders/parameters of that
responsibility for everyone concerned with a decision-making system and with the decisions it makes. A
possible structure might include:
– Those who determine policy;







– Final Decision makers;9
– Front line staff.
A critical point is that there should be a person or persons responsible or answerable for every decision
and for every stage in the process that leads to the final decision. Furthermore, it should never be the
case where blame for failure cannot be pinned on one or more people, i.e. there must be no gaps in the
accountability chain. Where a human makes a decision, whether based on machine ‘advice’ or not, the
decision maker is identifiable. However where a machine makes the decision, then if a decision turns out
to be wrong or harmful, there should be an clear audit trail back to the person or persons responsible for
this whether it be the politician who signed off on the policy or the programmer who wrote the code.
It is essential that it be clear from the outset where responsibility lies. An analyst or programmer cannot
be expected to be aware of potential nuances in a wicked social problem or even a relatively simple
problem like visa approval. The responsibility of the programmer is to code whatever the specification
specifies. Furthermore, it needs to be clear that there are real sanctions for errors that are appropriate to
the nature of the error and its cause as well as allowing for the degree of discretion or authority that the
person in question has. For example, if a system recommends a decision to a street level bureaucrat, can
that bureaucrat reject the advice or seek more information or does she have no choice but to implement
what the machine tells her? In addition, there need to be processes in place where humans can query and
refer such decisions upward without fear of reprimand.
Finally, sanctions need to be appropriate up to and including criminal indictment in extreme cases.
8It is worth noting that, at the time or writing, nobody in Boeing has resigned as a result of these disasters. One senior executive
has ‘retired’ (https://onemileatatime.com/737-max-executive-retires/).
9There will, of course, be decisions made by people in all of these groups. People should be responsible for the decisions that
they make, but in a proper system, to adapt the words of Harry Truman, the buck has to stop with one person or maybe group.
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The principles outlined are pragmatic and, if done properly, effective. Given human nature, they are also
likely, like many attempts to introduce good governance, to encounter resistance, but they are essential if
there is to be public trust in such systems and processes.
4.3. Regulation
Thirdly we propose that there should be a regulatory agency responsible for approving all algorithms
which affect people’s lives in a material way. This is simply the extension of a principle and praxis that
applies in many other areas of life. No medical drug may be prescribed or sold without the approval of the
appropriate authorities (e.g. in the USA, the Federal Drugs Agency, in the EU, the European Regulatory
System for Medicines). The same is true for all sorts of other products from aircraft to zoos. Often such
regulation is multi-layered. Drug regulators not only ensure that new drugs have been extensively tested,
they also supervise their production and increasingly today the supply chain that delivers them to avoid
forged or fake drugs entering the system.
What is needed is an agency to monitor and approve the use of algorithms, AI or not, in routine public
decision making, say an Artificial Intelligence/Algorithm Regulatory Agency (AIRA). The remit of such
an agency would be decision-making algorithms which have the potential to materially affect citizens,
business or other organisations on a continuing basis. It would not include, for example, decision support
systems or models built for one-off decisions. Such an agency could certify algorithms before they are
used, certifying that:
– They have designed and developed according to established software engineering standards;
– They are properly documented;
– They are appropriately transparent;
– An appropriate responsibility framework is in place;
– They have been thoroughly tested;
– Proper training courses are in place.
An AIRA would also have an appeal function whereby citizens, unhappy with a decision or the
explanation for that decision or in the case of a dispute, could appeal a decision to the agency for
arbitration.
4.4. Other possibilities
In addition to risk assessment, accountability and regulation, there are other actions that should be
considered. One is to mandate that all public sector decision-making software other than that related to
areas of state security and policing, should be open source. Another possibility is a charter of rights with
regard to machine decision-making. How does a citizen appeal against a decision made by a machine?
These, and other possibilities, require further exploration.
In some ways, the problems presented by contemporary AI and algorithm-based decision-making are
new; in others they are not. There have always been problems with (non-AI ) algorithms in “traditional”
ICT systems; the history of e-government is littered with computer generated problems (and disasters).
However, a key difference with AI is that it “learns” and this creates the possibility that it will learn the
wrong things and/or that it will amplify errors in the original design. Existing faulty algorithms repeat the
same mistakes. AI algorithms may have the capability to make new ones. AI and the drive to reduce costs
and increasing efficiency in the public sector is going to make the use of this technology increasingly
pervasive in the public sector and whatever the provenance of the problems that are ineluctably going to
ensue, it is preferable that they should be anticipated rather than reacted to in retrospect.
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5. Conclusion
Artificial intelligence (AI) takes many forms and it is not difficult to think of developments in AI that
have or will have implications, and often major implications, for public administration, public governance
and/or democracy as well as for individual citizens.
One manifestation of AI that is already generating extensive debate is the increasing use of algorithmic
decision-making for implementing public policy in a wide range of areas including, for example, medicine,
social work education justice and public housing. A growing number of scholars and commentators have
expressed concerns not just about machines making bad decisions resulting from poor design or coding,
but about more serious longterm risks such as inbuilt bias and the permanent embedding of existing
social prejudices and power structures in software. Decisions may also be influenced by the subconscious
prejudices of the individuals who formulate, clean and structure the data that is used in such systems.
At another level, there are questions about the ability of such systems to adjust to unforeseen circum-
stances or to be able to exercise the types of discretion that human actors often do when faced with
complex and nuanced social situations. The absence of human factors such as sympathy, empathy, insight,
experience and flexible thinking can lead to rigidity and potentially harmful consequences as machines
work with hard coded (and what may be poorly understood) rules as well numeric ranking systems that
try to reduce complex decisions to simple weights or scores.
Being able to detect and categorise these risks is essential in order to develop a systematic and
calibrated response. In this paper we have proposed a risk management framework comprising a two-by-
two typology and a three-dimensional risk spectrum that is designed to assist scholars and practitioners
interested in calibrating and managing such risks in the absence of structured accountability and legal
regulation of AI in the public sphere. Society needs to move fast on this. The speed of development of AI
is accelerating and there may come a tipping point whereby control of AI becomes impossible. We are,
just about, still at a stage where this can be controlled. We need to act now.
References
Ab Aziz, M. J., Dato’Ahmad, F., Ghani, A. A. A., & Mahmod, R. (2009 October). Automated marking system for short answer
examination (AMS-SAE). In 2009 IEEE Symposium on Industrial Electronics & Applications IEEE, Vol. 1, 47-51.
Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2017). Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets, NBER Working Paper No. 23285.
March 2017. Available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w23285.
Ananny, M., & Crawford, K. (2018). Seeing without knowing: Limitations of the transparency ideal and its application to
algorithmic accountability. New Media & Society, 20(3), 973-989.
Anderson, J. (2009). Illusions of Accountability: Credit and Blame Sensemaking in Public Administration. Administrative
Theory & Praxis, 31(3), 322-339. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25611001.
Arntz, M., Gregory, T., & Zierahn, U. (2016), “The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis”,
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 189, OECD Publishing, Paris.
EU High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (2019) “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI”. European Commission,
Brussels, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai.
Bannister, F., & Connolly, R. (2011). The Trouble with Transparency: A Critical View of Openness in e- Government, Policy
and Internet, 3(1), 1-30.
Bardon, S. (2107). Frances Fitzgerald resigns in ‘national interest’ to avoid an election, The Irish Times, 28 November 2017.
Berkelaar, B. L., & Buzzanell, P. M. (2014). Cybervetting, person – environment fit, and personnel selection: Employers’
surveillance and sensemaking of job applicants’ online information. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 42(4),
456-476.
Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.
Budd, K. (2019). Will artificial intelligence replace doctors? AAMC New, 9 July 2019, The Association of American Medical
Colleges. Available at: https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/will-artificial-intelligence-replace-doctors.
F. Bannister and R. Connolly / Administration by algorithm: A risk management framework 489
Carlson, A. M. (2017). The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing Algorithms. Iowa L. Rev, 103, 303-219.
Available at: https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/ILR-103-1-Carlson.pdf.
Coglianese, C., & Lehr, D. (2018). Transparency and algorithmic governance. Administrative Law Review, 71, 1.
Creemers, R. (2018). China’s Social Credit System: An Evolving Practice of Control. Available at SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175792.
Cunningham, S. M. (1967). The Major Dimensions of Perceived risk in Cox. D.F. (Ed.) Risk Taking and Information Handling
in Consumer Behaviour, Boston, Harvard University Press.
Derby Community Heath Service (2020) The Hunger Scale, NHS Trust. Available at: http://www.dchs.nhs.uk/assets/public/
dchs/llb/tools/tools_1-11/4_DCHS_A5_4pp_The_Hunger_Scale.pdf.
Dubnick, M. J. (2002). Seeking salvation for accountability. In Proceedings of the Annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, August 29–Setpember 1 2002, Boston. 29, 7-9.
Eggers, W. D., & Beyer, T. (2019). AI-augmented government: Climbing the AI maturity curve. Deloitte Insights. Available at:
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/industry/public-sector/government-trends/2020/ai-augmented-government.html.
Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
EU High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (2019) “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. A Definition of AI:
Main Capabilities and Disciplines”. European Commission, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai.
Fink, K. (2018). Opening the government’s black boxes: freedom of information and algorithmic accountability. Information,
Communication & Society, 21(10), 1453-1471.
Floridi, L., Cowls, J., Beltrametti, M., Chatila, R., Chazerand, P., Dignum, V., Lütge, C., Madelin, R., Pagallo, U., Rossi,
F., Schafer, B., Valcke, P., & Vayena, E. (2018). AI4People – An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportuni-
ties, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations. Minds and Machines, 28(4), 689-707. Available at: https://link.springer.
com/article/10.1007%252Fs11023-018-9482-5.
Fredriksson, C., Mubarak, F., Tuohimaa, M., & Zhan, M. (2017). Big data in the public sector: A systematic literature review.
Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration, 21(3), 39-62.
Guerin, B. (2018). Accountability in Modern Government, The Institute of Government. Available at: https://www.instituteFloridi
xgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IfG%20accountability%20discussion%20paper%20april%202018.pdf.
Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2009). Do transparent government agencies strengthen trust? Information Polity, 14, 173-186.
Karoly, L. A., & Panis, C. (2004). The 21st Century at Work: Forces Shaping the Future Workforce and Workplace in the United
States. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Klievink, B., Romijn, B. J., Cunningham, S., & de Bruijn, H. (2017). Big data in the public sector: Uncertainties and readiness.
Information Systems Frontiers, 19(2), 267-283.
Leadbeater, C. (2011). The Civic Long Tail, London: Demos.
Leon, S., & Orrios, L. (2019). ‘It’s Westminster’s fault’. Political identities and blame attribution in devolved systems, London
School of Economics. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/blame-attribution-in-devolved-systems/.
Lepri, B., Oliver, N., Letouzé, E., Pentland, A., & Vinck, P. (2018). Fair, transparent, and accountable algorithmic decision-making
processes. Philosophy & Technology, 31(4), 611-627.
Levi, P. (1966). Storie Naturale, Einaudi, Italy (published under the pen name Damiano Malabiaia).
Liang, F., Das, V., Kostyuk, N., & Hussain, M. M. (2018). Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China’s Social Credit System as
a State Surveillance Infrastructure. Policy & Internet, 10(4), 415-453.
Manyika, J., & Bughin, J. (2018). The promise and challenge of the age of artificial intelligence, McKinsey Global Institute
Executive Briefing, October 2019. Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/artificial-intelligence/the-
promise-and-challenge-of-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence.
Margetts, H., & Dunleavy, P. (2013). The second wave of digital-era governance: a quasi-paradigm for government on the Web.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 371: 20120382. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2012.0382.
Mitchell, A., & Diamond, L. (2018). China’s Surveillance State Should Scare Everyone, The Atlantic, 2 February 2018. Available
at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/china-surveillance/552203/.
Moon, D., & Adams, C. (2015). Too much of a good thing? Balancing transparency and government effectiveness in FOI public
interest decision making. AIAL Forum, 82, 28-39.
Moz (2019). Google Algorithm Update history. Available at https://moz.com/google-algorithm-change.
Myers West, S., Whittaker, M., & Crawford, K. (2019). Discriminating Systems: Gender, Race, and Power in AI The AI Now
Research Institute, Retrieved from: https://ainowinstitute.org/sdiscriminatingsystems.html.
Nash, M. (2017). “Examination of Using Structured Decision Making and Predictive Analytics in Assessing Safety and Risk
in Child Welfare” (Los Angeles: County of Los Angeles Office of Child Protection, May 4, 2017) Available at: http://
file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/bc/1023048_05.04.17OCPReportonRiskAssessmentTools_SDMandPredictiveAnalytics_.pdf.
Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism. NYU Press.
Ntoutsi, E., Fafalios, P., Gadiraju, U., Iosifidis, V., Nejdl, W., Vidal, M. E., & Kompatsiaris, I. (2020). Bias in data-driven artificial
490 F. Bannister and R. Connolly / Administration by algorithm: A risk management framework
intelligence systems – An introductory survey. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery,
10(3), e1356. Accessed 5 August 2020 at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/widm.1356.
Nwosu, J. C. (2017). Comparative Assessment of E-exam and E-marking Integration in selected Universities in Ogun State:
Undergraduate Student’s Perspectives. Development and Innovation Available at: http://www.incedi.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/06/290.pdf.
O’Brien, C. (2012) “No one is responsible for anything”, The Irish Times, 5 March 2012.
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction, Broadway Books.
Plantera, F. (2017). Artificial Intelligence is the next step for e-governance in Estonia” State adviser reveals. Available at:
e-estonia.com/artificial-intelligence-is-the-next-step-for-e-governance-state-adviser-reveals/.
Power, D. J. (2008). Decision support systems: a historical overview. In Handbook on decision support systems 1 (pp. 121-140).
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Pesudovs, K., & Noble, B. A. (2005). Improving subjective scaling of pain using Rasch analysis. The Journal of Pain, 6(9),
630-636.
RM Results (2018) The power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in e-marking. Available at: https://rmresults.com/blog/the-power-of-
artificial-intelligence-ai-in-e-marking.
Ruppert, E. (2013). “Not Just Another Database: The Transactions that Enact Young Offenders.” Computational Culture, issue 3.
Accessed February 11, 2014. Available at: http://computationalculture.net/article/not-just-another-database-the-transactions-
that-enact-young-offenders.
Saaty, T. (2000). Fundamentals of decision making and priority theory with the analytic hierarchy process (Vol. 6). RWS
Publications.
Sharma, T. (2019). How artificial intelligence can improve e-governance services? Insight and Resources: Global Tech Council.
Available at: globaltechcouncil.org/artificial-intelligence/how-artificial-intelligence-can-improve-e-governance-services/.
Shermis, M. D., & Burstein, J. (Eds.). (2013). Handbook of automated essay evaluation: Current applications and new directions.
Routledge.
Singer, N. (2019). Amazon is pushing facial technology that a study says could be biased, The New York Times, Retrieved from:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/technology/amazon-facial-technology-study.html.
Stanojevic, M. (2020). Best automated hiring software 2020, Windowreport.com. Available at: https://windowsreport.com/
automated-hiring-software/.
Valentine, S. (2019). Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control. Fordham
Urb. LJ, 46, 364.
Veale, M., Van Kleek, M., & Binns, R. (2018, April). Fairness and accountability design needs for algorithmic support in
high-stakes public sector decision-making. In Proceedings of the 2018 chi conference on human factors in computing systems
(p. 440). ACM.
Wachter-Boettcher, S. (2017). Technically wrong: sexist apps, biased algorithms, and other threats of toxic tech. WW Norton &
Company.
Warrell, H. (2019). Home Office under fire for using secretive visa algorithm, Financial Times, June 9, 2019. Available at: https://
www.ft.com/content/0206dd56-87b0-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2.
Whittaker, M., Crawford, K., Dobbe, R., Fied, G., Kaziunas, E., Mathur, V., Myers West, S., Richardson, R., Schultz, J., &
Schwartz, O. (2018). AI Now Report 2018 AI Report Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_ 2018_Re-
port.pdf.
Williamson, B. (2014). Knowing public services: Cross-sector intermediaries and algorithmic governance in public sector reform.
Public Policy and Administration, 29(4), 292-312.
Wind-Cowie, M., & Lekhi, R. (2012). The Data Dividend. Demos. Available at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/The_Data_
Dividend_-_web.pdf.
Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power, Profile
Books.
Copyright of Information Polity: The International Journal of Government & Democracy in
the Information Age is the property of IOS Press and its content may not be copied or emailed
to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
